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ABSTRACT
The “gig economy” has transformed the ways in which people
work, but in many ways these markets stifle the growth of
workers and the autonomy and protections that workers have
grown to expect. We explored the viability of a “worker-
centric peer economy”—a system wherein workers benefit as
well as consumers— and conducted ethnographic field work
across fields ranging from domestic labor to home health care.
We discovered seven facets that system designers ought to con-
sider when designing a labor market for “gig workers,” consist-
ing principally of the following: constructive feedback, assign-
ing work fairly, managing customer expectations, protecting
vulnerable workers, reconciling worker identities, assessing
worker qualifications, & communicating worker quality. We
discuss these considerations and provide guidance toward the
design of a mutually beneficial market for gig workers.
ACM Classification Keywords
H.5.m. Information Interfaces and Presentation (e.g. HCI):
Miscellaneous; See http://acm.org/about/class/1998/ for the
full list of ACM classifiers. This section is required.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past several years, a new type of work has emerged
where customers can hire someone to complete an individual
task, or “gig.” This task might involve delivering a package, or
driving someone downtown. Such a model principally requires
the sharing of capital-intensive goods, like access to a car or
home, which led to the popularization of its familiar name, the
“sharing economy.” People could “share” their homes (Airbnb,
Couchsurfing [6, 3]), cars (Uber, Lyft, and others [5, 2]), and
increasingly one’s own time (TaskRabbit, Zaarly, and many
others [4, 1]).
Workers’ demographics have changed dramatically in as little
as half a decade, largely discreetly. Where workers in the
sharing economy were once car and home-owners who had
For more details please contact the lead author on the paper. Source code available at
https://github.com/fuselabs/workerdispatch
free time to spare, many now think of these companies and
the markets they expose as their primary source of income.
In the last several years, workers for Uber, Homejoy, and
other market operators have initiated —and in some cases won
[19, 15]— suits describing mistreatment and misclassification
of these workers as “independent contractors” rather than
“employees” (protected and regulated by labor laws in the
United States) [13].
In the sharing economy’s nascent years, companies enticed
workers to join for the potential to do work “on the side”:
offering rides to others when they had free time, or renting out
their apartment when they were out of town for a weekend.
For various reasons, the culture has since changed, and the no-
tion of doing work in one’s free time has largely disappeared.
Instead, drivers report primarily working as drivers, and that
their primary sources of income consist of the aggregated sum
of passengers they pick up through ride-sharing markets. Even
in the hotelier industry, providers have purchased apartments
or re-purposed their own homes primarily to serve guest oc-
cupants, rather than to rent out incidentally when they have a
spare room or are out of town.
In these ways, workers are neither “peers,” nor are they “shar-
ing” resources that would otherwise go underutilized. But
they are not conventional workers, either. They acquire capital
—sometimes co-signing on leases with the companies that run
these markets— under their own names, run their businesses
relatively independently, and make the majority or even to-
tality of their income based on each individual job, or “gig,”
cumulatively summed up. With their careers described as a
series of individual jobs, each self-contained and relatively
independent of the others, people have renamed it the “gig
economy,” more fairly referencing the differentiating nature
of this work.
The widespread nature of these changes suggests that this
is part of a larger trend in what may become the future of
work; far from the hopeful but cautious predictions offered
of information workers and “crowd work” [21]. Workers
increasingly find themselves objectified, marginalized, and
frustrated by oppressive systems.
We considered, then, how one might design a worker-centric
peer market; how can system designers create technologically
enabled markets as successful as existing markets like Uber,
Lyft, and others, while also:
• giving workers a sense of locus;
• benefiting workers as well as consumers;
• facilitating worker organization and communication;
• enabling collective decision & action among workers.
To answer these questions, we engaged in extensive fieldwork
alongside workers and labor organizations in a number of
industries. Building in part from backgrounds in the social
sciences and as trained computer scientists, we learned about
workers and the industries in which they work from the work-
ers themselves. We report on the processes of making contact
with various formally organized worker advocacy groups, il-
lustrate some of the ways that we can learn from informants
most effectively given our own skills, and finally describe
some of the findings we made as a result of our own use of
these methods.
Informed by the input of dozens of workers from numerous
industries ranging from highly regulated to informal, we iden-
tify a number of aspects of on-demand work which system-
designers should consider in the creation of a worker-centric
labor market. We offer guidance on these design considera-
tions, and in some cases illustrate the suggested approaches
we generated in tandem with these partner organizations and
workers.
Specifically, we offer contributions to the following questions
• What components of existing markets are inextricable from
the features which make these markets successful?
• What can be disentangled and abstracted away?
• How would these groups be operated?
BACKGROUND & THEORY
The existing knowledge from which we draw in this research
can primarily be traced to two pools of research: The first
comes from the extensive body of research surrounding col-
lective action, and the work that has gone into describing,
categorizing, predicting, and even designing to foster cam-
paigns of collective action; the second major source of our
knowledge comes from the study of on-demand or gig mar-
kets. By synthesizing the discoveries from these sources of
research, we identify a priori guidance at this intersection of
two subjects.
The Long History of Collective Action
Grassroots, community-led organizations are not new: a sub-
stantial body of literature illustrates myriad approaches to
guiding communities and assisting in collective action. Specif-
ically, when we consider the role of insight into collective
action, we refer to action that Hardin describes as “directed
at an ongoing problem” [16]. The implication here, he ar-
gues, is that the guidance on this form of collective action is
dramatically more nuanced than “one-shot” collective action,
demanding an “anthropological investigation of minute inter-
relationships.” We might call this “ongoing” collective action.
Economist Mancur Olson proposes, in part, that collective ac-
tion depends on some large, generally inactive group in order
to succeed [27].
After decades of observations, Hardin posits that collective
action is too commonplace for Olson’s thesis to hold; He
suggests that the requirements for collective action which
Olson theorizes may have changed—specifically, lowering the
threshold—as a result of myriad factors outside of the scope
of this research, except to point out that recent work in online
collective action prompts further scrutiny of Olson’s thesis
and the critiques later researchers have levied. We suggest
an alternative consideration: that much of the research in
collective action in the space of human-computer interaction
(HCI) in fact corroborates the latent community requirement
Olson recommends. Myriad collective action endeavors seem
to succeed in part because they precipitate a collective of latent,
willing participants in some form of community action [9, 30,
29].
On-Demand Markets and Their Workers
A robust and growing body of research exploring collective
action and movements enabled by the Internet adds to a body
of knowledge previously uninformed by the tools the Internet
affords. Where collective action research coordinated and
executed offline describes challenges symptomatic of social
structures, researchers of online communities can and do of-
fer design guidance for the structure of online communities
[18]. Substantial contributions deeply investigating online
communities, such as Wikipedia, have lent system designers
guidance in designing communities geared toward some on-
going collective action online [26, 28, 31]. In this last case,
studies of Wikipedia and its users—known colloquially as
“Wikipedians”—is especially instructive, as it addresses the
distinction Olson makes between “one-shot” collective action
and what we will call “ongoing” collective action.
Researchers have described the potential of crowd work, and
perhaps more importantly outlined various problems with said
markets [21]. More recently, researchers explored the impact
of the sharing economy among socioeconomically disadvan-
taged communities, and studied norms and behaviors among
the workers of individual markets like Uber [12, 24]. The
directives offered by Kittur et al. provide substantial guidance
in the conceptual design of a “crowd market,” but the direct
application of this research to a communally led organization
—a worker-run labor market—merits further consideration.
The focus of technologically enabled peer economies is well-
explored; researchers have pointedly identified the efforts of
both for- and non-profit online peer markets and the chal-
lenges workers and market operators face [24, 8, 33]. Some
researchers have implemented independent micro-work mar-
kets for their own purposes [7], though the purpose of this
research was not to explore the idea of a worker-centric or
worker-led market.
Computational social scientists have documented workers’
efforts to circumvent the systems imposed on them by market
operators [24], and more directly researchers have observed
the continuing effort to resist and critique markets for “gig
work,” in these cases in the context of online labor, where
micro-work on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) predates
offline gig work companies such as Uber [20, 30].
Nevertheless, frustrations with these marketplaces persist, and
the trends among emerging marketplaces seem to commodi-
tize workers more and more aggressively. These “patches” of
existing markets appear to have only marginal effects on the
qualities of these markets: Uber drivers continue to resist algo-
rithmic matching while walking a fine line to avoid retribution
from management, and some of the most frustrating requesters
on AMT continue to antagonize Turkers.
Juxtaposed, but not Synthesized
Broadly, these bodies of research have overlapped in limited
cases [30, 20]. The intersection of “community-driven ac-
tion as a mode of designing” and “design of technologically
enabled peer markets” represents a field site ready for the
application of existing knowledge, and perhaps the produc-
tion of new. We begin to bridge this research by applying
our learnings regarding collective action (both offline and on-
line) to what we have learned from research surrounding the
“gig economy” in its various names. Drawing on the spirit of
critical theory research and the grievances found among gig
workers [20, 24], we began our fieldwork thinking about the
viability of a self-directed crowd.
METHOD & POSITION
We approached this research with some amount of reflexivity,
as described by Geertz and elaborated by others [14, 25], to
acknowledge the role we play as participants in the culture
we study. Reflexivity affords other benefits, however: it al-
lowed us to avoid an undue and perhaps hopeless struggle to
separate ourselves and objectify the communities we studied,
and engage with participants more transparently, rather than
attempting to abandon our preconceptions and existing mental
models.
Finding Participants, Making Partners
Our process began by finding organizations with demonstrated
success in areas such as worker advocacy and collective action,
hoping that their experience in offline work would inform on-
line working groups. We found a variety of organizations rang-
ing small worker cooperatives to national-scale labor unions,
and began to make contact with several. After a number of crit-
ical introductions by mutual contacts, we had a diverse range
of partners ranging in size and spanning several industries.
We worked with five organizations: Organization A, organi-
zation B, organization C, organization D, and organization E.
Organization A is a labor union that spans the nation, although
we specifically worked with a union chapter local to our area;
workers in this group are regulated by state laws describing
qualifications and eligibility to work. This represented one
of the more formalized, organized groups that we worked
with. Organization B represents more than one million work-
ers across various industries. The specific vertical of work
we studied involved health care, and the degree of regulation
involved with this group was even greater than with organiza-
tion A. Organization C is a national labor union and worker
advocacy group which supports tens of thousands of workers,
many of whom are women and of minority groups. We worked
with a local group that organization C supports named orga-
nization E, which helps domestic workers and house cleaners
find work in our approximate geographic area. Finally, we
worked briefly with organization D, a labor union that broadly
advocates on behalf of many organizations of workers and
expressed interest in representing existing workers in the “gig
economy,” such as Uber and Lyft drivers.
With each group, we explained our interest and motivation as
researchers exploring the idea of a worker-centric labor mar-
ket; we also attempted to describe what we hoped to contribute
to this space. At the time, we imagined a “worker coopera-
tive” —a worker-owned organization that often makes deci-
sions democratically—and we found surprising (at the time)
resistance from some worker-led organizations with which we
spoke. But this presented us with opportunities to learn about
the perceived shortcomings of various organization structures.
As our interviews and discussions progressed, we mocked up
designs based on what we learned. By bringing these mock-
ups to subsequent meetings, and iterating quickly based on the
feedback workers provided us with, we were able to demon-
strate in our own ways as computer scientists and designers
that we were both listening to and learning from their input.
This process, time-consuming and labor-intensive though it
was, made important strides to prove the overarching claim
that we were invested in these groups and respected the guid-
ance they provided as equal partners.
Mock-ups offered another benefit that may be uniquely ac-
cessible to designers. As we found ourselves struggling to
explain concepts such as privacy and trustworthiness in tan-
gible ways, and thus failing to get substantive answers to
questions around these issues, we realized that we could illus-
trate various paradigms, extrapolate from them, and learn how
workers felt about design choices through their preference and
especially from their suggestions for revision.
We ultimately spent more than three months making contact
with, and learning from, these groups. For several weeks (ad-
mittedly fleeting, in the context of ethnographic fieldwork), we
learned through participation–observation: answering phone
dispatch requests and triaging the worker assignment system
when interactions mediated by existing technologies broke
down. We gained significantly deeper insights about workers
and customers as a result of this time, but engaging in the
uncomfortable, time-intensive, and tiring work of liaising with
customers and triaging worker dispatch proved our level of
commitment as greater in scope than a short-lived research
project.
EMERGENT THEMES
We identified several aspects of the on-demand markets we
studied that seem to apply in generalizable ways. These char-
acteristics and issues extend beyond the more narrowly scoped
issues of scheduling workers and handling payments which
might seem more at the focal point of designing a labor mar-
ket, although those issues too must be addressed; we focus
specifically on the social negotiations that a technological
system must broker. These guidelines are illustrated using
mock-ups and a mobile application front-end developed in
tandem with organization C, organization B, and organization
E, and consist of the following considerations:
1. Constructive feedback
2. Assigning work fairly
3. Managing customer expectations
4. Protecting vulnerable workers
5. Reconciling worker identities
6. Assessing worker qualifications
7. Communicating worker quality
1. Constructive Feedback
Ratings cause anxiety, whereas feedback can satisfy the same
administrative needs without causing workers undue stress.
At organization E, we learned that workers interpreted nega-
tive feedback very personally, making it difficult for them to
internalize that feedback constructively and act on the sugges-
tions customers made. Multiple issues may have been at play
here: cultural differences might explain a mismatch in how
feedback is offered and how it is received, but so too would the
power imbalance between undocumented domestic workers
and their customers.
Organization E didn’t seem to investigate the cause of this ef-
fect, but their solution circumvented this problem entirely.
Rather than giving workers unfiltered, raw feedback as it
streamed in, organization E intercepted reviews from cus-
tomers and distilled them into constructive, actionable feed-
back. Both praise and criticism would sometimes be read
aloud to the entire group, with identifying information re-
moved.
The purpose of reading positive feedback publicly was to
reaffirm the group’s sense of worth in a shared sense of success;
the purpose of reading the negative feedback, meanwhile, was
to prompt workers to reflect on what went “wrong,” and how to
avoid such an outcome in the future. A shared sense of failure
also seemed to affect workers in these cases; whether this is
an outcome of public readings of reviews, or more complex
relationships between workers and organization E, is unclear.
Speaking with Uber and Lyft drivers, we found an alternative
approach to providing workers with feedback: drivers are
made aware of an aggregated rating—generally a moving
average of the previous n ratings—but they are not exposed
to qualitative feedback in any form, even when customers
provide it.
A driver’s current aggregated rating, it turns out, is extremely
important: a driver’s rating determines the worker’s eligibility
to do work, and falling below various thresholds carries vari-
ous consequences. Reports suggesting that these thresholds
are finely tuned as well as closely guarded secrets make these
markets particularly emotionally taxing for workers [11].
When we spoke to drivers, they relayed stories of apparent
obligations to take expensive remedial courses if their overall
rating dropped below a certain threshold, and widely held fears
of suspension and deactivation for falling below an unknown
level weigh heavily on workers’ minds. Frustration directed at
drunk, clumsy, or naive passengers accidentally or deliberately
giving drivers a rating of 4 (out of 5) stars further exacerbates
stress.
Markets which aim to empower “gig workers” should use
quantitative rating systems sparingly, or to prompt more de-
tailed qualitative feedback, as we illustrate in Figure 1. Quan-
titative ratings in the form of Likert scales followed by quali-
Figure 1. Given quantitative prompts and qualitative follow-up ques-
tions, research suggests that users are more likely to write more, which
can better inform.
tative prompts for feedback seem to precipitate more detailed
feedback [17].
Quantitative metrics—especially those that are opaquely
evaluated—do not benefit workers, nor does it seem they
even inform appropriate customer behavior [32]. Meanwhile,
constructive feedback suggesting improvements may provide
workers with the necessary information to improve as pro-
fessionals without causing undue stress over issues such as
worker eligibility.
2. Assigning Work Fairly
Who gets new work opportunities first is a contentious issue
which should be negotiated by people, enforced by technology.
When new work becomes available, who should have first
access to claim it proves to be a contentious topic. Depending
on the intended velocity of the market, various suggestions
have emerged.
In existing technologically enabled markets, we find some
of these decisions have been made carefully. Some of these
approaches are worth considering, and can be described thusly:
• On AMT, Turkers find themselves in constant competition
with one another to claim HITs (human intelligence tasks);
the effects of this task searching behavior have been ex-
plored in some detail [10].
• Airbnb, Craigslist, and others invite workers to describe
the services or products they offer, and leave the work of
matching to customers. The complex nature of finding a
suitable place to live may make this approach preferable
over automated matching.
• Uber, Lyft, and others use algorithmic matching to deter-
mine who should be offered work; it is unclear to workers
and consumers who is given a job offer first, but drivers we
spoke to assumed that the nearest drivers were given first
offer of a new job in markets such as Uber & Lyft.
Among each of these approaches designers can make choices
that dramatically affect the experiences for workers and cus-
tomers. The first option, used by AMT, Craigslist, etc. makes
it possible for job turnover to be extremely high, but the cost is
that workers may feel stressed by the uncertainty over whether
a job they’re considering has already been claimed. The sec-
ond approach mentioned, which Airbnb uses, gives customers
the choice to contact “workers,” but the process of finding a
provider makes the overall matching process time-consuming.
When we spoke with members of organization B and organi-
zation A, the consensus we initially found was that seniority
within a reasonable proximity to the work would be the fairest
solution to the problem we described. After some discussion,
it emerged that this position was not universally shared among
members of either group. Perhaps understandably, younger
members of organization B felt that workers who had been
working longer that day without having been offered any jobs,
or workers who were significantly closer, should eventually
be given higher priority for work.
Organization E chose yet another option, primarily using a
random selection process at the beginning of each hiring day
by pulling the names of currently present workers out of a jug:
every eligible worker has a reasonable chance at being selected
first, just as they have a chance of coming up last. Workers
could short-circuit the selection process by volunteering to do
work beneficial to the group—for example, making coffee, or
sweeping the common room’s floors. By volunteering to do
this work, they’re guaranteed first priority for incoming jobs
the following day.
The best option for most markets might be the model Uber,
Lyft, and others have adopted, where customers are automati-
cally routed to workers, who are given a time window where
they have exclusive claim to a job that’s been posted. If they
reject a job offer, the job moves to the next eligible worker.
The task of finding eligible, willing workers can be simplified
by considering availability, narrowing the list of candidate
Figure 2. From the client’s perspective, a lightweight scheduling system
can suffice to communicate availability.
workers to those who are interested in working during a given
time frame. This can, however, be a particularly frustrating
challenge for on-demand workers. One of the most common
reasons we heard from gig workers who preferred such work
was the flexibility that mode of work offered; in other words,
trying to get workers to commit to windows of availability
goes against the nature of that work—the freedom—which
made it appealing to those we consulted.
This challenge was ameliorated in various ways across field
sites. At organization E, workers were assigned each day even
if work was solicited days or weeks in advance (unless, of
course, a specific worker was requested for repeat work). This
process neatly handles the potentially ambiguous question of
availability for a number of workers, but it’s limiting in two
ways:
Figure 3. From the worker’s perspective, scanning suggested start times
can make scheduling easier than entering a series of windows of avail-
ability each week or month.
1. Organization E’s scale is ultimately limited by their ability
to process workers on a daily basis (this was particularly
salient as a volunteer was processing workers as they arrived
to check in at 7 A.M.).
2. Workers who wished to be available for leads had to travel
to the organization E offices; sometimes workers would
travel north for 30 minutes, only to get a job 30 minutes
south again.
Instead of setting availability in advance, we suggest optimiz-
ing the process of scheduling so that workers and customers
spend a minimal amount of time negotiating one another’s
availability.
This leaves open the question of how that list of workers is
determined: who is the first choice, and who’s second if the
first worker doesn’t claim the job? Who ends up getting last
pick?
We can only offer that this factor is determined in large part
by the organization running the system. A template for a
worker-run marketplace should therefore expose these options,
and more importantly surface the debate at the core of these
discussions, while abstracting away the technical details such
as implementation. These cases also illustrate that systems can
be designed in ways that meaningfully and fairly reward work-
ers for doing necessary work for the benefit of the community
as a whole.
3. Managing Customer Expectations
Clear expectations of all participants in trade benefit all, but
introducing those expectations can be difficult for all parties.
Perhaps the most common source of dissatisfaction with gig
workers comes from a miscommunication or simply a mis-
match in the expectations of the customer and the worker. The
effects of this mismatch appear to have been considered when
creating AMT, leading to norms where “good” requesters
know to provide examples of correct work and highlight com-
mon mistakes, explicating the intent of the micro work. On
other platforms, clear expectations are established ahead of
time (on ride-sharing markets, the expected driving path, esti-
mated time, and estimated cost is displayed to customers).
People we spoke with at organization B, organization E, and
organization C felt that formalizing the expectations of work-
ers was the most appropriate solution to this problem. By
making it clear to customers what workers are expected to do
(for instance, what specific tasks go into cleaning a kitchen),
expectations of customers are set reasonably, workers can be
trained properly, and disputes about whether the worker did
the job properly or sufficiently become less ambiguous.
We tend to agree with this approach. In our fieldwork we
found that paper checklists made it clearer to customers what
to expect to be done—and importantly, what to expect not to
be done. If customers wanted additional work completed, they
could specify that and agree to the extra time it would take to
do that job, which they sometimes did.
This “contract” between workers and customers can be writ-
ten collaboratively by both parties, outlined by the workers
themselves, or directed principally by customers as they de-
scribe the work they need completed; the exact process is less
important than the shared understanding of the constituent
tasks.
4. Protecting Vulnerable Workers
Many workers in the gig economy are vulnerable to exploita-
tion; careless or malicious systems can endanger workers.
At organization E, workers expressed concern when we dis-
cussed the ability to show a profile picture to customers in
advance of their arrival. These concerns stemmed from fears
of their privacy being violated, and discrimination over their
race, age, gender, and other characteristics. In particular, work-
ers at organization E were afraid that customers would reject
them for being too old.
Organization E addressed this issue by emphasizing the qual-
ifications of workers, abstracting their names and details for
first-time jobs. Workers fundamentally have final say over
whether to be matched to a customer, based on general data
about the location, an indication of whether they’ve worked
together before, and a rough estimate of the amount of work
solicited. (In most cases, a precise estimate of how long a job
will take is difficult to make without someone familiar with
the work on-site to make an informed estimate.)
If a customer has hired through organization E before and
wants to hire a previously hired worker, a rudimentary system
allows volunteer dispatch staff to identify those workers for
matching. This allows workers to gradually develop a body
of clients over time; eventually, they no longer rely on or-
ganization E to refer customers to them at all. Organization
Figure 4. Explicit checklists make it easier for workers to verify that
they’ve completed all expected work; it also makes it apparent to cus-
tomers if they need to add or clarify certain tasks.
A utilized a similar approach, allowing customers to request
a worker they’ve worked with in the past, but otherwise not
revealing information about workers to customers.
Many of the existing marketplaces for gig work don’t expose
such affordances to request a previously hired worker. This
may be deliberate, as it effectively prevents workers from fos-
tering a community of clients. By preventing workers and
customers from becoming familiar with each other, workers
remain dependent on the market created by the platform to
provide leads on customers. Whether a system promotes such
dependence or not is up to the system’s designers, but we artic-
ulate a possible approach which makes repeat work possible.
As we illustrate in Figure 5, a simple interface exposing basic
information about a previously hired worker can remind a
customer whom they want to select. Further, a technological
solution such as this can ease the negotiation of scheduling: in
Figure 5. By exposing some information about previously matched work-
ers, a system can facilitate workers developing a reliable customer base.
our case, we suggest prompting the worker for their availabil-
ity; once several times are suggested, the customer can select
and confirm a time.
Working with organization B, nurses we spoke to expressed
concern over disrespectful or uncooperative patients. Nurses
described various safety concerns including violent neighbor-
hoods, dangerous pets such as dogs, and patients in declining
mental health. Nurses told us that these were inherent risks
associated with in-home care. Some of the nurses that we
spoke to clarified that, in cases where they felt a particular
danger, they may decline to meet a patient and communicate
that concern later.
Technological systems can assist workers in cases like these:
by exposing customer contact information to workers (and
potentially vice versa), workers can contact customers before
they begin work to clarify or resolve any issues.
5. Reconciling Worker Identities
The very features that make gig work appealing also stymie
attempts to coalesce stable worker advocacy groups.
At organization E, organization A, organization C, and orga-
nization B we observed a subtle but important characteristic:
everyone at these organizations identified themselves by the
work that they did. Members of organization E self-identified
as house cleaners and day laborers; people at organization
A were workers, first and foremost. The same fundamental
sentiment was shared by nurses affiliated with organization B.
We found that this carried an important effect. At organiza-
tion E the effect it was most noticable that workers identified
together and recognized the importance of maintaining or-
Figure 6. A simple interface for workers, allowing them to contact cus-
tomers, facilitates the resolution of potential issues before work begins,
such as difficulty finding a location, ambiguity in instructions, etc.
ganization E’s positive reputation among customers. Every
week, organization E administrative staff would read reviews
of workers, made anonymous beforehand, allowing the work-
ers to reflect on these frequent successes and occasional fail-
ures.
Perhaps most surprising was a shared sense of success and
failure when workers listened to this feedback; people we
spoke to felt that they had upheld or let down their peers and
the organization of which they were part, even if the review
was not of their own work. This strong sense of group identity
seemed to drive workers to work hard to maintain the already
good reputation that organization E enjoyed.
When we spoke to drivers in the gig economy, some told us
that they had previously worked for competing yellow cab
companies. They explained that the reason they gave up on
conventional cab companies was because requirements to drive
for yellow cabs felt onerous. Drivers worked for Uber and
Lyft because those markets allowed them to drive as much
or, importantly, as little as they wanted. At some yellow cab
companies, a monthly fee was required for access to the cabs
themselves.
This presents a potential challenge for those hoping to build
communities fostering collective decision-making and action.
As Kraut et al. point out [22], a crucial component in designing
successful online communities is identification with the group.
This is already a difficult goal to achieve, now exacerbated by
the nature of the community involved. Features that make gig
work appealing—the freedom to come and go as one pleases,
for instance—make it that much more difficult to form a shared
sense of community based on shared identities.
Indeed, workers in the gig economy tended not to think of
themselves as identified by the work that they do— many
drivers, for instance, volunteered that they were musicians,
security guards, and even elementary school teachers. Their
work as drivers, then, was not substantively important to who
they are. Workers at organization E, meanwhile, identified as
cleaners, day laborers, etc. without qualification.
Among many of the “gig workers” that we spoke to, the sense
of freedom and independence turned out to be an important
feature of their identity. The relative freedom over when and
indeed whether to work was, it seemed, powerfully appealing.
This represents a difficult dilemma for labor unions and other
conventional worker advocacy groups, which rely on the
shared sense of identity of workers, who are now increasingly
detaching their identities from the work that they do.
We assume that a worker-centric market needs emotional in-
vestment from its participants in order to succeed, and the
evidence seems to corroborate this sense [30, 27, 16]. Given
this premise, it seems that workers in a system must appreciate
their reliance on their group’s collective success. Balancing
this need with the desire that workers have expressed to re-
main unburdened by various requirements might prove to be a
difficult act, but a necessary one.
We have little concrete guidance for this challenge except to
say that system designers might strive to find ways to make it
palatable for gig workers to identify collectively and to recog-
nize that their individual success is collectively determined by
the quality of all of their work. By forming a sense of shared
identity and investment in that community, a constructive sort
of self-policing might emerge, as briefly discussed by Lave &
Wenger [23].
6. Assessing Worker Qualifications
Workers in variably regulated markets similarly seek to prove
their qualification; they accomplish this in different ways.
In interviewing workers across industries we found that work-
ers with formalized qualifications wished to emphasize the
value of the formalized qualifications that they offer; in the
case of electrical workers, strictly regulated by the state in
which we were conducting research, workers feared that unli-
censed, unregulated workers potentially tarnished the reputa-
tions of workers with legitimate credentials.
In the driver-for-hire market, we generally trust that drivers
for Uber, Lyft, and even yellow cab companies are legally
qualified to drive a car. While passengers rarely ask to see
proof of licence and it is rarely shown (except, sometimes, in
the cases of yellow cabs), it is widely assumed that a worker
given access to the market and its consumers has sufficiently
proven to the market operators (Uber, Lyft, etc.) that the driver
is qualified. The perceived risk of being caught without a valid
driver’s licence seems sufficiently discouraging that fears of
abuse and deception are not widely held in the United States,
where this research was conducted.
As we interviewed members of organization A, we discovered
a complex web of laws describing the ratios of variously quali-
fied workers and other workers on construction and other work
sites. In short, a work site would be deemed in violation of
construction regulations if too many inexperienced workers
are working without sufficient more senior workers on the
premises to oversee the work. This requirement proves chal-
lenging to follow under the status quo as a worker calling in
sick abruptly one morning may cause the work site to fall out
of regulation.
Computer scientists may observe that this problem is simple
enough to address, at least to augment a human-driven process
of finding another worker with sufficient credentials to take
the absent worker’s place for the duration of the absence. We
consider this one of the more formalized qualifications pro-
cesses, and is roughly in line with the qualifications concerns
we encountered when interviewing home health care workers
through organization B.
We found less formally regulated, often homegrown, modes
of qualifying workers at other organizations. At organization
E and through organization C, we found that organizations
would determine worker qualifications using highly special-
ized criteria. For instance, at organization E, we found that for
day laborers they kept track not just of things like whether they
were proficient English speakers, but also kept track of a wide
array of qualifications describing whether they were eligible
to take jobs involving yard work, heavy lifting, painting in
various forms (e.g. with a brush versus with a spray canister),
and numerous other factors.
This system generally worked, with a notable exception. One
day, while volunteering for the phone dispatch system at orga-
nization E, we received a call asking for someone who could
paint with a spray canister. We correctly matched a worker to
that call, but when another worker arrived to pick the worker
up (the cheapest of three options for getting the worker to the
work site), it came to light that the worker did not want to
work for a contractor—which this customer was. Our solution
was to hastily find another worker who would be able to paint,
which we managed to do expeditiously. Later, we discovered
that we had neglected to verify that the worker was able to
paint with a spray canister, which he was not. Ultimately, the
worker was sent home and the work was not completed that
day.
It should go without saying that this was a failure in attempting
to match a worker and a customer. The individual points
of failure, however, can inform the design of an automated
system to match workers and customers. The first in the series
of otherwise avoidable mistakes occurred as a result of the
worker not being able to make an informed decision about the
customer requesting them. When the problem emerged, we
sourced a worker according to a different procedure from the
method used during the rest of the day—specifically, hastily—
and as a result we overlooked details that otherwise would
have prevented the second worker from claiming (or even
wanting to claim) the work for which he was not qualified.
These considerations would be simple, but not necessarily
intuitive, to implement in a computer system.
7. Communicating Worker Quality
Groups use social pressure to encourage good actors or dis-
courage bad actors & ensure high quality, but rarely both.
Another issue that arose during fieldwork surrounded the verifi-
cation that a worker was of high quality. To reference existing
platforms again and using Uber and Lyft in this case, the
quality of a worker can be illustrated simplistically by the
quantitative ratings that drivers often have. The distinction
between qualification and quality is important; to use driving
as an example once again, a driver may be qualified (typically,
licenced to drive & insured) but not high quality—for example,
struggling to navigate in tricky roads, unfamiliar with the area,
etc.
We found two primary ways of communicating worker quality:
• guaranteeing outcomes
• vouching for good work
At organizations with high barriers to membership, work can
be guaranteed by the organization of workers. This guarantee
gives customers relative confidence that any issues will be rec-
tified at a cost fully absorbed by the organization, rather than
the customer. To cover these costs, work groups generally tax
workers for each job to form a “rainy day fund” in anticipation
of such an expense.
In the case of organization A, if work is not done satisfactorily
well, organization A’s guarantee involves paying for a new
worker to do the job correctly at the organization’s expense.
Workers whose work requires fixing are punished in various
ways depending on the nature of the error and whether the
worker has done inadequate work in the recent past; work-
ers essentially face increasingly severe punishments as they
repeatedly make mistakes (or make mistakes of greater cost).
It is important to note that these organizations can make this
guarantee for two reasons. The first reason is that membership
exposes workers to work opportunities that make attempting
to gain membership worthwhile. The second reason is that
membership eligibility is non-trivial to achieve, and transgress-
ing community norms and risking expulsion carries significant
consequences, especially given the work opportunities that
they would be jeopardizing.
Organization E addressed this challenge using community
pressure fostered by shared emotional investment in the or-
ganization. Through democratic administrative systems and
frequent meetings mandatory for all active workers, a sense of
communal buy-in seemed to take form among workers who
felt that their failure to do good work would let down the rest
of their peers. Organization E further stoked this sense of com-
munity investment by reading feedback from customers, made
anonymous by organization E, to the group during all-hands
meetings. Workers reportedly felt a sense of shared success
when good feedback arrived, and similarly felt a shared failure
when feedback was critical.
We discovered that quantitative ratings weigh heavily on work-
ers, causing anxiety over arbitrary and opaque feedback neg-
atively affecting their eligibility as workers. Platforms like
Uber and Lyft warn their workers that a user rating below a
certain threshold (for example, rolling average under 4.8 on
a 1–5 scale) may result in disciplinary action. Drivers, for
instance, told us of courses they had to take if the average of
their ratings fell below 4.6/5.
We can—and will—discuss ways to make quantitative rating
systems less damaging in practice, but we find that numeric
ratings overwhelmingly tend to harm workers; feedback—
rather than ratings—proves a more effective way to improve
workers [17], and customers’ responses to negative ratings
seem to be exaggerated [32]. Given these apparent weaknesses
in numeric ratings, we propose that efforts to communicate
reputation should attempt to maximize qualitative data, rather
than minimize it as many systems (e.g. Uber, Lyft, etc.) do.
This sense of shared reputation and the desire among individ-
uals to uphold it was reportedly very strong. We discovered
that workers, fearing their refusal to do certain kinds of work
would reflect poorly on organization E, would agree to do
work even when it was inappropriate to do so. Examples of
impropriety include using unfamiliar mechanical equipment
and working in hazardous settings with inadequate protection.
In light of this, the organization has had to remind workers to
take a firm stance when customers make unreasonable requests
of them.
Whether worker motivation stemmed genuinely from invest-
ment in their community or from a more practical desire not
to lose the job they’ve gotten that day is unclear. However,
considering the high demand we found during our fieldwork
we suspect that this practical desire was not significantly in-
fluential. In other words, workers could turn down work and
confidently expect to be offered another worthwhile job, if
they were only concerned with earning money.
DISCUSSION
We spent several months working alongside workers in var-
ious industries, iterating on mockups and prototypes, and
getting feedback from members and administrators of worker-
advocacy groups like organization C, organization B, and
organization D. With their insights, we identified a number
of aspects of gig work that potentially marginalize workers,
and in doing so we begin to articulate ways to avoid such an
outcome. These potentially marginalizing aspects in the peer
economy consist of the following:
1. Constructive feedback
2. Assigning work fairly
3. Managing customer expectations
4. Protecting vulnerable workers
5. Reconciling worker identities
6. Assessing worker qualifications
7. Communicating worker quality
We discussed the importance of such a system given the ex-
isting trends in technologically enabled labor markets, and
suggest an alternative market design wherein workers might
operate their marketplace collectively. Finally, informed by
ethnographic fieldwork and interviews, we distill what we
believe conscientious system-builders would need to create a
worker-centric peer economy.
It is worth noting that while we worked with workers from
various industries, seeking to find common threads between
each community, we can’t speak to the applicability of these
findings across all conceivable industries and modes of work.
Information workers such as those on AMT may differ in
significant, fundamental ways compared to drivers-for-hire
such as Uber drivers.
Above all, we hope to convey the potential insight one can gain
by working with stakeholders, and the importance of collabo-
ratively designing labor markets with the workers themselves.
As Kittur et al. point out, as researchers, computer scien-
tists, and participants in the technological community we ask
whether “. . . we foresee a future crowd workplace in which we
would want our children to participate” [21]. Indeed, we must
answer this question, by articulating an economy that empow-
ers and respects workers, not one that than marginalizes and
exploits them.
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